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1 Introduction
Dictator games have been extensively used to study unselfish behaviour both in eco-
nomics and psychology (see, e.g., Camerer 2003; Engel 2011). Recently the external
validity of the observations was questioned again; the extent of anonymous altruism
observed in these games seems to be exaggerated and an artefact of experimentation
(Bardsley 2008) and confounded by experimenter demand effects (Zizzo 2010, 2013).
Being told in a laboratory experiment that one is allowed and given the opportunity
to share some endowment may induce sharing behaviour that otherwise would not be
observed to the same extend (List 2007; Winking and Mizer 2013).
Zizzo (2010) argues that non-deceptive obfuscation is suited for reducing such
cognitive experimenter demand effects in the laboratory. In this study we apply this
approach of non-deceptive obfuscation by embedding the dictator game in a more
complex decision environment that renders the dictator decision to share some en-
dowment less salient what should reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect.
Indeed, participants are neither instructed that they will have an opportunity to share
some endowment nor that they will be allowed to share some endowment with an
anonymous interaction partner. Instead, we present our experiment participants with
a dynamic household savings decision problem. The focus of this study is, however,
less on the reduction of cognitive experimenter demand effects but on the investiga-
tion of gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination.
To learn about intertemporal allocation, and in particular about gender differences
in such problems may be interesting in itself: Switching from unitary to non-unitary
models1 to assess households’ decision making allowed economists to control for fac-
tors such as relative income and age (Browning et al 1994; Phipps and Burton 1998;
Pollak 2005). However, not much has been said to evidence gender differences within
such a context. Browning (2000) shed a first light by introducing life expectancy to
motivate further analysis. Indeed, on average, women live longer than men, and wives
are younger than husbands. That said, it is to be expected that both men and women
will have different incentives for saving, generating gender biases in intra-couple re-
source allocation choices (Anderson and Baland 2002; Commuri and Gentry 2005).
This motivates the design of our experiment.
Here, however, we are mainly interested in the extend of (un)selfish behaviour,
its gender specificity, and gender discrimination. Much experimental research, both
from psychology and economics, was conducted to account for gender differences
in terms of cooperation (Mason et al 1991; Sell et al 1993; Simpson 2003), trust
and reciprocity (Eckel and Grossman 2001; Saad and Gill 2001; Razzaque 2009),
altruism (Bolton and Katok 1995; Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001) and corruption
(Lambsdorff and Frank 2011; Alatas et al 2009). A variety of games such as the trust,
the ultimatum, and the dictator game were used in these studies and showed that
gender differences prevail. Yet, looking at these studies individually no consistent
pattern seems to emerge: women seem neither consistently more nor less socially
oriented than men, their social preferences seem rather more context specific (Croson
1 Unitary models refer to models where households maximize a single utility function. Non-unitary
models are those considering as many utility functions as individuals in the household.
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and Gneezy 2009). While in e.g. Ben-Ner et al (2004) and Houser and Schunk (2009),
two studies explicitly studying the effect of the receiver’s gender in the dictator game,
female subjects tend to give more to males than females Engel (2011)’s meta study of
dictator games reveals that women tend to give more and tend to receive more (with
the dictator gender then being insignificant) than men. However, only 39 out of 131
articles analysed in Engel (2011) report on the existence or absence of (recipient)
gender effects.
Hence, our contribution relies on designing a game that allows studying gender
specific interpersonal allocation behaviour when the gender of the partner is known
without the interpersonal allocation task being salient.
Due to its obvious procedural fairness when being implemented in the form of
random dictators dictatorship is surprisingly often used outside the lab. Empirical ex-
amples of random procedures are lotteries to allocate goods and burdens (see, Elster
1988). Judges, jurors and soldiers are, for instance, frequently selected by a random
device. By considering a periodic random dictatorship we allow both partners to be
decisive and alter the final outcome by anticipating the allocation choice of their pairs.
By investigating the interpersonal allocation behaviour in a (more natural) context,
the artificiality of the standard dictator game is reduced. This would strengthen the
external validity of our findings. Accordingly, this article is also a contribution in a
novel context to the literature on gender differences and discrimination in economic
decision making.
In section 2 we introduce the dynamic decision model with the two players F
and M which is solved for the conditions used in the experiment. The experimental
design is introduced in section 3. After analysing the results in section 4 our main
conclusions are finally summarized in section 5.
2 The Dynamic Allocation Game
For the two players F andM let f, respectivelym denote their life expectations where
we assume
f >m> 1, (1)
i. e. F-players live longer. Irrespective of that, M-players also face an intertemporal
allocation problem. Apart from the difference in life expectations we do not impose
any differences. More specifically, both partners evaluate a pattern ζ = (C1, . . . ,CT )
of consumption values CT in periods t= 1, . . . ,T(6 f) according to
ΠF =
f∏
t=1
Ct and ΠM =
m∏
t=1
Ct (2)
with Πi being the monetary earnings (in experimental currency units) of our experi-
ment participants. Thus, partners would choose the same consumption pattern if they
had identical life expectations and the same (other-regarding) utility function.
To determine ζ we assume that in every period t both partners F and M submit a
proposal stating how much to spend in that period t. After that it is then independently
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and randomly decided (with equal probabilities) in each period t = 1 to m which of
the two proposals is implemented, i. e. whether Ct = yt (proposal of the F-player) or
Ct = xt (proposal of the M-player) applies. Of course, consumption patterns ζ are
restricted by the available funds. LetW1(> 0) denote the initial wealth which can be
used for consumption purposes. Since
Wt =Wt−1 −Ct−1 for t> 2, (3)
early consumption restricts later consumption so that
06 xt 6Wt, 06 yt 6Wt and thus 06 Ct 6Wt (4)
must hold for all periods t= 1,2, . . ..
To derive the optimal behaviour we assume risk neutral players. We assume risk
neutrality since, due to their many “lives” in the experiment, participants should
mainly be motivated by what they earn on average (see also Eichberger et al 2003;
Rabin 2000). The constructive proof (see the Appendix) shows that we mainly rely
on dominance arguments in the sense of dominant strategies. As opposed to other
game theoretic contexts, risk neutrality does not have to be commonly known.
We allow, however, for other-regarding preferences in the form of social ties (see,
e.g., van Dijk and van Winden 1997; van Winden et al 2008; van Winden 2012) that
can be represented by the following utility functions
UF = ΠF×ΠαM and UM = ΠM×ΠαF . (5)
The parameter α allows for positive or negative weights on the interaction partner’s
earnings in the own utility. For the sake of notational simplicity we omit any indices
for α. Note, however, that α is specific to each decision maker and the interaction part-
ner.2 Intrinsic altruistic (or spiteful) preferences can be represented by an α > 0 (or
< 0) independent of the interaction partner. In-group favouritism (see, e.g., Ahmed
2007; Chen and Li 2009) and discrimination against members of specific groups
(Becker 1971; Ayres and Siegelman 1995; Büsch et al 2009) can be represented by
αs that depend on the interaction partner.
For i = F,M a strategy si(·) must assign a proposal (yt, respectively xt) for the
consumption level Ct in period t for all residual wealth levels Wt in t and for all
possible periods t. Optimal choices y?t(Wt) and x
?
t(Wt) will, of course, anticipate
rational future decision making. By applying backward induction one can prove (see
the Appendix)
y?t =
{
(1+α)Wt
α(m−t+1)+f−t+1 ∀ t6m
Wt
f−t+1 =
Wm+1
f−m form< t6 f
(6)
and
x?t =
(1+α)Wt
α(f− t+1)+m− t+1
∀ t6m. (7)
2 In contrast to the above mentioned studies, for our purposes we assume α to be static within one
life, i.e. one instance of the dynamic allocation game. As we will discuss in the section on experimental
design each life be will rather short and the feedback on the partner’s choices will be limited and stochastic,
minimizing the opportunities for updating one’s affective social tie what justifies our assumption.
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If F does not care about M’s earnings, i.e. if her α = 0, the optimal feasible
consumption proposal y?t ∈ Γt of player F simplifies to
y?t =
Wt
f− t+1
∀ t6m, (8)
resulting in consumption smoothing over the own remaining time to live. If M’s
earnings contribute positively to F’s utility Fwill make bigger consumption proposals
in the periods t6m
∂y?t
∂α
=
Wt(f− t+1−m+ t−1)
(α(f− t+1)+m− t+1)2
> 0 form< f. (9)
In the extreme, F will make consumption proposals that maximize M’s earnings,
smoothing the available wealth overM’s remaining time to live
lim
α→∞y?t = Wtm− t+1 ∀ t6m. (10)
If M’s earnings contribute negatively to F’s utility F will make smaller consumption
proposals in earlier periods leading to more than own earnings maximizing remaining
wealth in later periods of her life.
In the case that M does not care about F’s earnings, i.e. if his α = 0, the optimal
feasible consumption proposal x?t ∈ Γt of playerM simplifies to
x?t =
Wt
m− t+1
∀ t6m, (11)
consumption smoothing over the own remaining time to live. If F’s earnings con-
tribute positively toM’s utilityM will make smaller consumption proposals
∂x?t
∂α
=
Wt(m− t+1− f+ t−1)
(α(f− t+1)+m− t+1)2
< 0 form< f. (12)
In the extreme, M will make consumption proposals that maximize F’s earnings,
smoothing the available wealth over F’s remaining time to live
lim
α→∞x?t = Wtf− t+1 . (13)
If F’s earnings contribute negatively to M’s utility M will make bigger consumption
proposals in earlier periods leading to less than own earnings maximizing remaining
wealth or even no wealth in later periods of his life.
Therefore, it turns out that optimal, utility maximizing behaviour does not depend
on what the other intends to do: Optimal behaviour requires consumption smoothing
over the remaining (joint) life time.3
Although the decision problem is quite complex, e. g. in the sense of a dynamic
game, the optimal behaviour is quite obvious and prominent. Thus, both players will
certainly be close to their optimal conditional consumption smoothing. Since the life
of the M-player will be shorter we expect the decisions of the M-player to be most
3 Due to repeated random dictatorship consumption sequences are stochastic.
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relevant for our analysis. If theM-player opportunistically consumes the whole resid-
ual endowment in the last period of his life the earnings of his F-partner in this life
are then equal to zero. If theM-player leaves some endowment for consumption after
his last period he reduces his own earnings but allows the F-player to earn something
as well. Leaving exactly the number of units that the F-player lives longer will ensure
equal earnings for both players in the according life. Thus, behaviour in this pivotal
period of a life can be compared to that in standard dictator games. Whether the M-
player leaves any endowment for his longer living F-partner after his last period of
life may reveal insightful gender differences in our setting.
3 Experimental Design
We run four treatments with identical initial endowments W1 = 21 and life expec-
tations of m = 4 and f = 6. Consequently, with the assumption of selfish pure own
earnings maximizing behaviour and the expectation to earn zero in about half of all
“lives” the expected earnings of the F-player is still substantially higher than the ex-
pected earnings of the M-player. This should further limit the extent of M-players’
deliberate unselfish behaviour induced by a cognitive experimenter demand effect.
Lastly, the partner’s gender is always known to each participant. In treatment (i)
a male assumes the position of the M-player and a female that of the F-player, and
vice versa in treatment (ii). In treatment (iii) both roles are assumed by females and,
finally, in treatment (iv) both roles are assumed by males. Each subject experiences
only one treatment condition. This 2×2 between subjects design (see table 1) allows
to distinguish between discrimination against a gender and gender specific behaviour.
In the experiment a participant experiences ten successive “lives”, always assum-
ing the same role4 F or M what should provide better chances for learning. The first
two lives are “single lives”, whereas lives three to ten are “couple lives”. The “single
lives” at the beginning of a session make the saving decisions and optimal own earn-
ings maximising behaviour more salient and easier to learn as there is no stochastic
element that otherwise would slow down learning (see, e.g., Dittrich et al 2012). Dur-
ing “single lives” participants can also get used to choosing rational numbers as the
optimal choices during these lives are given by y? = 3.5 and x? = 5.25; consumption
choices are only restricted to be non-negative. The software used for the experiment
provides access to an on-screen calculator what should reduce any impact of differing
cognitive abilities between participants.
In each period within the “couple lives” both players F and M submit simultane-
ously a proposal stating how much to consume in that period of their current “couple
life.” After that it is then randomly decided with equal probabilities which of the
two proposals is implemented for both participants. Participants are then informed
only about the implemented proposal. Hence, a participant is not informed about the
partner’s proposal in a period when the partner’s proposal was not implemented.
Within the “couple lives” there is no rematching. The participants are playing
eight lives with the same partner. Thus, “reincarnation” only allows to learn how to
4 In the experiment the roles were labelled ‘A’ and ‘B’.
Dynamic Repeated Random Dictatorship and Gender Discrimination 7
Table 1 Treatments and Number of Couples (Independent Observations)
Life expectation m= 4 f= 6 # Couples
Gender male female 12
male male 13
female female 12
female male 12
Total 49
“live” with the same partner and not to diversify by playing differently with different
partners. This repetition should result in a more reliable measure. This is akin to
sequences of mini-dictator game decisions that are, for instance, also elicited for the
Ring test of social value orientation (Liebrand and McClintock 1988) which enjoys
some popularity in the experimental economics literature (see, e.g., Brosig 2002; van
Dijk et al 2002; Kanagaretnam et al 2009).
If anything, this partners design should be more likely to increase the overall
cooperativeness of M-players for strategic reasons than to decrease it; it reinforces
the influence of reputation and repetition-based reciprocity (Andreoni and Croson
2008; Engelmann and Fischbacher 2009; Gächter and Falk 2002; Nowak 2006). This
strategic incentive works in the opposite direction of our efforts to mitigate a potential
cognitive experimenter demand effect. Therefore, if we still observe a decline in the
number of times the M-player leaves some endowment for his partner as compared
to a standard dictator game we can consider this as an indication for an effective
reduction in the cognitive experimenter demand effect.
Payoffs are measured in points, summed up over all rounds, and then transformed
into Euro (e ) by 8 points = e 0.01. This ensures average earnings above the hourly
wage of our participants which are usually in the range of e 5 to e 9. In addition to
these earnings participants received a show up fee of e 2.50.
4 Experimental Procedures and Sample
The experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Insti-
tute of Economics in Jena, Germany. Ninetyeight randomly recruited undergraduates
from various departments of the Friedrich Schiller university who stated their gen-
eral willingness to participate in experiments earlier participated in the experiment.
While the gender composition of the various departments can be unbalanced the gen-
der composition of the whole university and therefore of our subject pool is almost
perfectly balanced (approx. 55 % females).
More than half of the subjects (55.8 %) had a partner or was even married (this
was the case for three participants). About half of the participants (49%) had a back-
ground in economics or business administration. Around one fourth was enrolled at
another humanities department. Further fields of study were e. g. law or computer
sciences.
After entering the lab, subjects were seated at computer terminals and received
written instructions. Questions were answered privately. The experiment was pro-
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Fig. 1 Few M-players are kind: Distribution of endowments at the beginning and less the M-players’
consumption proposal of period 4
grammed and performed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The participants were as-
signed to one of the two roles (M- or F- player) according to their gender and the
assigned treatment. Each of the four treatments was performed by twelve couples,
except for the male-male treatment, where thirteen “couples” participated (see table
1). Since we always invited female and male students, two or more treatments were
conducted at the same time in each session. We conducted six separate sessions with
10 to 28 participants each. On average, each session took about 50 minutes in total.
M-players obtained an average total payoff of e 7.39 (SD 1.46) including the
show up fee and the earnings from the two single lives. F-players obtained an average
total payoff of e 10.85 (SD 3.11).
5 Experimental Results
We now analyse the M-players’ decision in the fourth period of his eight “couple
lives”, the decision that is comparable to the decision in a standard dictator game. We
then complement this with insights from a post-experimental questionnaire.
First, however, let us note that while until the end of their “single-lives” about a
third of participants did not learn to perfectly smooth consumption over their remain-
ing time to live there is no gender bias in the ability to learn consumption smoothing
during the “single lives” (p= 0.21).
Observation 1 Rather fewM-players are ‘kind’ to their F-partner.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of endowments at the beginning of period 4 over
all “couple lives” and treatments and the distribution of these endowments minus the
M-players’ consumption proposal. If participants were choosing only own payoff
maximizing consumption choices we would expect the endowments to be in the range
of 5.25 to 10.5. Indeed, more then 75% of endowments are in that range; only 62
endowments are below and 34 endowments are above. Kolmogorov-Smirnov-tests
show that the distributions do not differ between the four treatments.
An indicator for whether participants care for each other would be the amount
left by M-players after the fourth period. In 247 out of 392 cases (63 %; or 60 % if
we consider only cases where the endowment was at least 5.25) an M-player would
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M: female − F: female
relative frequency of leaving zero
and less than 2 units in period 4
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Fig. 2 Female F-players get more: Frequencies of how often an M-player would consume the whole
endowment and how often he would leave less than 2 units of the endowment in period 4 in the four
different gender constellations
Table 2 The M-players’ consumption proposal depends only on the F-players’ gender: ANOVA for num-
ber of times the M-players leaves less than two units in period four based on a multilevel logistic model
Factor Deviance Resid. Df Resid Dev. F P[>F]
maximal model 48 319.65
M-Gender 1.82 47 317.83 0.304 0.58
F-Gender 33.94 46 283.89 5.681 0.02
M-Gender:F-Gender 0.43 45 283.46 0.073 0.79
reduced model 48 319.65
F-Gender 33.42 47 286.23 5.786 0.02
not have left anything for his partner. This is considerably higher than the 36% of
participants not sharing their endowment reported in the meta-study of Engel (2011).
While we may consider this a successful reduction of the cognitive experimenter
demand effect a substantial amount of unselfish behaviour remains.
Observation 2 Regardless of theM-player’s own gender a female F-player is treated
much kinder than a male F-player.
There are substantial differences considering the gender constellations as can be
seen in Figure 2. Corroborating the results of Engel (2011)’s meta study a male F-
player is left more often with nothing or with less than 2 units than a female F-player
independent of the M-players’ gender. While female M-players also leave amounts
between 0 and 2 (and more) units for their partner, maleM-players either leave noth-
ing or 2 and more units in period 4.
A logistic regression on the relative number of times an M-player would leave
less than two units after period 4 shows that female F-players have a significantly
lower probability of having an endowment of less than two units in period 5 (p =
0.02). There are no significant differences with respect to the gender of theM-player,
the relevant dictator. The results of the correspondong ANOVA5 can be found in table
2. The model includes a factor for the gender of theM-player, a factor for the gender
5 While the model reported here has only one observation for each participant we also ran a repeated
measures ANOVA on all individual fourth period choices of the eight “couple lives” to test for “lives”
effects that may indicate any learning dynamics. We found none (F= 1.14,df= 7,p= 0.34).
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Fig. 3 The estimated probability for anM-player leaving at least two units in period 4 is increasing with
the endowment and is bigger if the F-player is female
of the F-player, and the interaction of these factors. Note, that we have to control
for overdispersion. This maximal model can be reduced by stepwise elimination of
factors that do not significantly contribute to the explanatory power. The minimal
adequate model contains only the factor for the F-player’s gender.
Analysing the relative number of times an M-player consumes the whole endow-
ment yields the same result: only the factor for the F-player’s gender is significant
(p= 0.02).
Based on a multilevel logistic regression in which we also include the available en-
dowment for each consumption decision we compute expected probabilities of leav-
ing at least two units in period 4. As can be seen in figure 3, corroborating the re-
sults of Andreoni and Miller (2002), M-players are more likely to leave at least two
units of endowment after period 4 when it is less costly for them, i.e. when there
is relatively more endowment left at the beginning of period 4. Of course, the more
favourable treatment of female F-players can also be seen here.
To provide a more complete description of the data we depict in figure 4 the
mean consumption proposals over all couple lives but separate for each couple and
implied endowments left for the F-player after period 4, the M-players’ end of life,
assuming future consumption proposals would equal the current one. Since the en-
dowment in each period t > 2 is stochastic the raw consumption proposals are not
easily compared. We, therefore, plot the consumption proposals relative to the opti-
mal consumption proposal for an M-player with α = 0 according to equation (11).
The overall means of these values for each period are given in table 3. For better
comparison of the distribution of proposals between male and female M-players the
plotted values are sorted from low to high for each period.
The M-players’ consumption proposals are rather heterogeneous. We observe
both over- and under-consumption, implying a range of negative and positive α-
values. The distribution of consumption proposals for male and female M-players
seems almost identical. Indeed, separate Kruskal-Wallis tests for each period do not
show any significant differences at the 5% level but for the fourth period supporting
again our above observation.
The overall lower mean value in table 3 for period 4 can be explained by the fact
that even the spiteful, over-consuming M-players can not consume more than the
available endowment in period 4.
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Fig. 4 M-players are more altruistic towards female F-players independent of their own gender
Table 3 Average consumption proposals relatrive to the optimal proposal given α= 0
Gender of Player Period
M F 1 2 3 4
M-player male male 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.92
female male 0.98 1.03 1.02 0.89
male female 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.83
female female 1.13 1.10 1.00 0.83
F-player male male 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.05
male female 1.01 0.98 1.01 1.09
female male 0.98 0.90 0.94 0.93
female female 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.94
To complete the description of the data we depict in figure 5 the F-players’ mean
consumption proposals over all couple lives but separate for each couple. The plotted
values are constructed in the same way as above, using equation (8) to compute the
optimal proposal for α= 0. The overall means can also be found in table 3.
Again, we observe rather heterogeneous choices and under- and over-consumption,
implying negative and positive α-values. While table 3 seems to indicate that F-
players are nicer to male M-players independent of their own gender, i.e. F-players
consume relatively more when paired with a maleM-player, separate Kruskal-Wallis
tests for each period do not indicate any statistically significant differences (p > 0.1).
Observation 3 The favourable treatment of female F-players seems not to be a result
of deliberate intentions; participants are not aware of their gender discrimination.
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Fig. 5 There are no differences in the F-players’ consumption proposals with regard to their own gender
or the M-players’ gender
Are these gender discriminating choices reflected in our participants’ self-assess-
ment? With the help of a post-experimental questionnaire we derived a measure for
subjective fairness attitude. Additionally, we asked whether females are fairer than
males, whether females are fairer towards other females than towards males (sub-
jective female solidarity) and whether males are fairer towards other males than to-
wards females (subjective male solidarity). The questionnaire consisted of several
statements that were to be evaluated on a scale from one to six standing for com-
pletely wrong and absolutely right. Some statements were repeatedly presented but
each time rephrased and put in a different way such that we get a more reliable mea-
sure in the aggregate.
Our measure for subjective fairness attitude reveals that females assess them-
selves fairer than males assess themselves (Wilcoxon, p= 0.01).
This leads directly to the question whether females are also considered fairer
than males by our participants. This is negated considering the whole population
(Wilcoxon, p < 0.01).6 Whereby on average females themselves seem to be even
more diffident than males (Wilcoxon, p< 0.01) in evaluating who is the fairer gender.
Though not significant at the 5 % level, we want to present the quite revealing rank
correlation between subjective fairness attitude and the evaluation whether females
are fairer than males: corfemale =−0.29 (p= 0.05) and cormale = 0.10 (p= 0.48). As
can be seen, females with a higher subjective fairness attitude tend to negate the ques-
tion whether females are fairer than males. Whereas, males with a higher subjective
fairness attitude tend to affirm this question. Consequently, both genders seem to be
rather chary.
Eventually, both, males and females, negate the question whether females are
fairer towards their own gender than towards males (Wilcoxon, p < 0.01; female
sub-sample p < 0.01; male sub-sample p = 0.04); and they also agree to negate the
question whether males are fairer towards their own gender than towards females
(Wilcoxon, p < 0.01; female sub-sample p < 0.01; male sub-sample p < 0.01).
Finally, we asked our participants with whom they would like to repeat the ex-
periment, a female or a male. About two thirds of the participants are indifferent.
6 We test whether the observed score of the measure is different from the neutral score, i.e. the mid-point
of the scale.
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The remaining third stating some preferences for a female or male partner shows no
significant inclination either.
These observations are supported by the following rather anecdotal evidence. Af-
ter the experiment some participants firmly rejected the possibility that there might
be any difference between the two genders. The most common reaction was the ex-
pressed disbelieve in anyone conditioning his or her behaviour in the experiment on
the gender of his or her partner. A similar observation is reported by Fershtman and
Gneezy (2001) whose participants where totally amazed after being debriefed by the
fact that they discriminated against one group without being aware of it.
To sum up, while the post-experimental individual self assessment reflects own be-
haviour during the experiment the assessment of the respective group behaviour does
only partly so. Although male rivalry and chivalry seem to be at least subconsciously
anticipated female solidarity is not. Thus, the observed behaviour, in particular the
general preferential treatment of females, seems not to be a result of mature and well
reasoned intentions. Participants are not fully aware of their own discriminating be-
haviour.
6 Discussion
In this study we embedded a dictator game in a more complex decision environment,
a dynamic household savings decision problem, to render the dictator decision to
share some endowment less salient what should reduce the cognitive experimenter
demand effect that would otherwise lead to an exaggerated level of observed altruism
(Bardsley 2008; Zizzo 2010). This in turn would strengthen the external validity of
our findings. We then used this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender
specific allocation behaviour and discrimination.
Compared to a standard dictator game, we indeed observe a substantially lower
probability of sharing anything of the endowment indicating that we have success-
fully reduced the potential cognitive experimenter demand effect. In general rather
few M-players are ‘kind’ to their F-partner in the sense of leaving some endowment
for consumption after the fourth and last period ofM’s life. On the other hand, being
‘kind’ depends on the gender of the F-partner. Regardless of her partner’s gender a
female F-player is treated in a kinder way than a male F-player. This is in line with
the results of Engel (2011)’s meta study of dictator games – based on 39 articles re-
porting on the existence or absence of gender effects out of a total of 131 analysed
articles – which showed that women tend to give more and tend to receive more (with
the dictator gender then being insignificant) than men.
Since this positive discrimination is independent of the decision makers’ own
gender it can not be driven by their cognitive abilities.
Further, the results of a post-experimental questionnaire indicate that this feature
of their behaviour is not anticipated by our participants. Thus, the observed behaviour
may be deduced from a rather instinctive female solidarity and men’s chivalry to-
wards the opposite gender.
It is interesting to note that this positive discrimination of females may compen-
sate the potential negative economic effect of their true longer life expectation outside
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the laboratory and the implied gender bias in intra-couple intertemporal resource al-
location. Moreover, partnerships outside the laboratory may last long enough to rein-
force the partnership specific affective social ties and thus to amplify the effect of the
observed positive discrimination.
From our experiment we conclude that indeed the behaviour of participants in
experiments depend on their partner. Surprisingly men and women do not act very
differently since they both discriminate men and favour women. Yet, they are not
aware of this. When running experiments one should therefore take care that the
composition of a single session is not biased towards either gender. Otherwise the
participants may form beliefs that they will interact most probable with only one of
the two genders and thus may act differently. Further, since gender effects are only
reported if significant the evidence so far is somewhat ambiguous. To shed more light
on whether or not there really exists a robust gender difference in economic decision
making one should always test for these differences and report the test results even if
they indicate that there is no significant difference.
Appendix
A Instructions (translation)
The following experiment consists of ten rounds. A round consists of several periods. In each round, money
can be earned in a fictitious currency (points). On completion of the experiment the aggregate of all per-
round earnings is paid out in cash, based on the relationship of 8 points = e 0.01. You will also receive an
additional basic amount of e 2.50 for participating.
In principle, the task of a round is to distribute an initially available amount S of 21.00 points onto
several periods.
For greater clarity, the amount that is spent by a participant in period one will be referred to as x1, that
of period two as x2, etc. Accordingly, you are required to spend a certain amount xt in any experienced
life period t. In the next period you will only have the residual balance S−x1− . . .−xt available for
spending. A round’s earnings are calculated as the product of all single amounts that were spent in each
experienced life period during this round. You should further note: When spending a zero-amount in a
period, you will earn nothing in that round (since one of the factors is zero in this case).
There are two different types of participants:
- A-participants for whom a round consists of six periods. (their per-round earnings G are calculated
as:G= x1x2x3x4x5x6)
- B-participants for whom a round consists of the first four periods. (their per-round earnings G are
calculated as:G= x1x2x3x4)
Before round one begins, you will be told which type (A or B) you are and, hence, how many periods you
live per round.
In rounds one and two you make your decisions absolutely independently of other participants’ deci-
sions.
In round three and all subsequent rounds (up to round ten) you will be allotted to some other partic-
ipant. This other participant (allotted to you) will be of the other type, i. e. if you are a type A participant
with six periods to live, your allotted other participant will only live four periods in that same round and
vice versa. You remain allotted to the same participant during all eight rounds. This participant can either
be female or male. Which gender the participant (allotted to you) has, you will be told at the beginning of
the third round.
Each pair of participants then decides for each period t simultaneously with, and independently of,
the other participant how much he/she wants to spend in a given period. After both participants have
made their decision, one of the two decisions is drawn by lot. This drawn-by-lot decision will be valid
for both participants, i. e. it becomes the amount of spending xt for that particular period t and for both
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participants (A and B). The amount is deducted from the residual budget of the two participants. For
the first four periods of every round, decisions are determined in this manner. In periods five and six,
the participant who lives through six periods, can make his/her autonomous decisions again. Per-round
earnings are calculated for both participants as described above. During the entire experiment, a button in
the lower left screen corner is available for access to a pocket computer.
Your entries will remain anonymous because we are only able to assign any of your data to your code
number – not to your person. If you have any questions concerning the experiment, please, raise your
hand. We will then try to answer your questions privately. Please do not speak with your neighbours since
any exchange of information will render your data useless for our purposes. In that case we will have to
exclude you from the experiment and refrain from paying you any money.
B Questionnaire (translation)
All statements of the questionnaire except for the first were answered on a six point scale raging from
completely wrong to completely right.
– If you were to repeat this experiment with whom would you prefer to interact?
Options: with a man, with a woman, I do not care
– Women are fairer towards women than towards men.
– The experiment was unfair.
– I did not understand what I was supposed to do.
– Men are fairer towards men than towards women.
– Men are more egoistic than women.
– I had barely influence on my earnings.
– I am satisfied with my decisions in this experiment.
– I felt treated fair in this experiment.
– Women are fairer than men.
– In this experiment I was especially fair.
– All should get the same amount of money just for participating and regardless of their performance in
this experiment.
– The main point is I earned a lot.
– I do not care for the earnings of other participants.
– My decisions in this experiment were easy.
– My partner in this experiment is simpatico.
C Constructive Derivation of Benchmark Solution
We prove (i) that the parameter α describing the weight of the partner’s earnings in one’s own utility
function determines together with the remaining times to live how much of the total wealth should be
consumed during the joint life time of both, M and F-players, and how much should be left for the
remaining periods of the F-players longer life, and (ii) that conditional conditional consumption smoothing
in the sense of consuming that amount which results from spreading the so determined available funds
equally over one’s own remaining joint life time is optimal for both players at any t 6m and for the
remaining periods of the F-player’s longer life after t=m.
C.1 The F-Players Optimal Consumption Proposals
First, let uF(W,C) denote the log utility of F and E[·] the expectation operator then
E[uF(W,C)] =
f∑
t=0
E[f(Ct,t)]+α
m∑
t=0
E[f(Ct,t)] with f(Ct,t) = logCt, (14)
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whereCt is an element of the set of feasible consumption decisions Γt, i. e.Ct ∈ Γt = {06Ct 6Wt}.
Ct is randomly dictated by player M or F. With xt and yt denoting the consumption proposal of M
and F respectively we get
E[f(Ct(xt,yt),t)] =
{
1
2 logxt+
1
2 logyt for t6m
logyt form<t6 f
(15)
and
E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,yt),t)] =
{
Wt−
( 1
2xt+
1
2yt
)
=E[Wt+1] for t6m
Wt−yt =E[Wt+1] form<t6 f
(16)
defining the expected transition of wealth from period t to t+1. Assuming a program, y, that maximizes
the above expected utility, we can define the following value function at time t as:
V?(Wt,t) = max
yt=(yt ,...,yf)
(1+α)
m∑
τ=t
E[f(Cτ(xτ,yτ),τ)]+
f∑
τ=m+1
E[f(Cτ(xτ,yτ),τ)] (17)
Assume we know thatV?(Wt+1,t+1)=V(Wt+1,t+1) and thatyt?=(y?t , . . . ,y
?
m) is the program
that maximizes (17). By the Principle of Optimality we know that if the optimal decision today is yt? =
(y?t , . . . ,y
?
f), then the sequencey
t+1?=(y?t+1, . . . ,y
?
f)will be optimal starting tomorrow. Thus, we can
write:
V?(Wt,t) = (1+α)E[f(Ct(xt,y?t),t)]+V
?(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,y?t),t)],t+1)
= (1+α)E[f(Ct(xt,y?t),t)]+V(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,y
?
t),t)],t+1) for t6m
and (18)
V?(Wt,t) =E[f(Ct(xt,y?t),t)]+V
?(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,y?t),t)],t+1)
=E[f(Ct(xt,y?t),t)]+V(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,y
?
t),t)],t+1) for t >m
If there was a yˆt ∈ Γt such that
(1+α)E[f(Ct(xt, yˆt),t)]+V(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt, yˆt),t)],t+1)>
(1+α)E[f(Ct(xt,y?t),t)]+V(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,y
?
t),t)],t+1) (19)
then there would be a program yˆt that would result in a higher value for V? than yt?, where yˆt+1 is the
program that maximizes
V(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt, yˆt),t)],t+1) =V?(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt, yˆt),t)],t+1). (20)
The existence of such a program, however, would contradict the optimality of yt?. Therefore there cannot
be such a yˆt and thus:
V?(Wt,t) =

maxyt∈Γt [(1+α)E[f(Ct(xt,yt),t)]+
V(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,yt),t)],t+1)] for t6m
maxyt∈Γt [E[f(Ct(xt,yt),t)]+
V(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,yt),t)],t+1)] for t >m
(21)
that leads to V?(Wt,t) =V(Wt,t).
By the first order condition for yt we have for allW and t6m at the optimum:
(1+α)
∂E[f]
∂yt
(Ct(xt,y?t),t)+
∂V
∂E[T ]
(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,y?t),t)],t+1)
× ∂E[T ]
∂yt
(Wt,Ct(xt,y?t),t) = 0. (22)
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For t>m we obtain the same equation without the factor 1+α. We substitute (22) for ∂V/∂E[T ] into
∂V
∂Wt
(Wt,t) =
∂E[f]
∂Wt
(Ct(xt,y?t),t)+
∂V
∂E[T ]
(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,y?t),t)],t+1)
× ∂E[T ]
∂Wt
(Wt,Ct(xt,y?t),t) (23)
and get for t6m
∂V
∂Wt
(Wt,t) =
∂E[f]
∂Wt
(Ct(xt,y?t),t)
−(1+α)
∂E[f]
∂yt
(Ct(xt,y?t),t)
∂E[T ]
∂Wt
(Wt,Ct(xt,y?t),t)
∂E[T ]
∂yt
(Wt,Ct(xt,y?t),t)
. (24)
The Euler equation can then be derived with the help of ∂V/∂Wt+1:
(1+α)
∂E[f]
∂yt
(Ct(xt,y?t),t)+
(
∂E[f]
∂Wt+1
(Ct+1(xt,y?t),t+1)
−(1+α)
∂E[f]
∂yt+1
(Ct+1(xt+1,y?t+1),t+1)×
∂E[T ]
∂Wt+1
(Wt+1,Ct+1(xt+1,y?t+1),t+1)
∂E[T ]
∂yt+1
(Wt+1,Ct+1(xt+1,y?t+1),t+1)
 (25)
×∂E[T ]
∂yt
(Wt,Ct(xt,y?t),t) = 0.
We can now solve for the optimal consumption proposal of player F. The Euler equation reduces finally to
1+α
2y?t
+
(
0+
1+α
y?t+1
)(
−
1
2
)
= 0 ⇒ y?t = y?t+1 for t <m
and (26)
1
2y?t
+
(
0+
1
y?t+1
)(
−
1
2
)
= 0 ⇒ y?t = y?t+1 for t >m
It immediately follows that for t>m player Fwill spread the available wealth equally over the remaining
periods
y?t =
Wt
f−t+1
=
Wm+1
f−m
for t >m (27)
At t=m the value function V that player F tries to maximize can hence also be written as
V(Wm,m) =(1+α)(0.5 logxm+0.5 logym)
+
(
0.5(f−m) log
Wm−xm
f−m
+0.5(f−m) log
Wm−ym
f−m
)
(28)
Therefore follows
∂V(Wm,m)
∂ym
= 0.5
1+α
y?m
−0.5
(f−m)
Wm−y?m
= 0 (29)
y?m =
(1+α)Wm
α+f−m+1
. (30)
Using equation (26) allows us then to conclude that the optimal feasible consumption proposal y?t ∈
Γt of player F is
y?t =
(1+α)Wt
α(m−t+1)+f−t+1
∀ t6m. (31)
At any time the choice of the optimal consumption proposal y?t does not depend on present or future
choices of M’s consumption proposal xt+i∀ i > 0 but only on present available funds Wt, the own
remaining time to live f−t+1, and until period t=m the parameter α and theM-player’s remaining
time to livem−t+1.
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C.2 TheM-Players Optimal Consumption Proposals
TheM-player’s optimal consumption proposals can be derived in an analogous manner. In the following
we therefore only sketch this derivation.
First, while keeping the above definitions let uM(W,C) denote the log utility ofM then
E[uM(W,C)] =
m∑
t=0
E[f(Ct,t)]+α
f∑
t=0
E[f(Ct,t)] with f(Ct,t) = logCt, (32)
Assuming a program, x, that maximizes the above expected utility, we can define the following value
function at time t as:
V?(Wt,t) = max
xt=(xt ,...,xm)
(1+α)
m∑
τ=t
E[f(Cτ(xτ,yτ),τ)]+α
f∑
τ=m+1
E[f(Cτ(xτ,yτ),τ)]
(33)
and analogous to the above proof for player F we obtain
V?(Wt,t) = max
xt∈Γt
[(1+α)E[f(Ct(xt,yt),t)]+V(E[T(Wt,Ct(xt,yt),t)],t+1)] (34)
that leads to V?(Wt,t) =V(Wt,t) and eventually to the Euler equation
(1+α)
∂E[f]
∂xt
(Ct(x
?
t ,yt),t)+
(
∂E[f]
∂Wt+1
(Ct+1(x
?
t ,yt),t+1)
−(1+α)
∂E[f]
∂xt+1
(Ct+1(x
?
t+1,yt+1),t+1)×
∂E[T ]
∂Wt+1
(Wt+1,Ct+1(x?t+1,yt+1),t+1)
∂E[T ]
∂xt+1
(Wt+1,Ct+1(x?t+1,yt+1),t+1)
 (35)
×∂E[T ]
∂xt
(Wt,Ct(x?t ,yt),t) = 0.
This Euler equation reduces to
1+α
2x?t
+
(
0+
1+α
x?t+1
)(
−
1
2
)
= 0 ⇒ x?t = x?t+1 for t <m (36)
At t=m the value function V that playerM tries to maximize can be written as
V(Wm,m) =(1+α)(0.5 logxm+0.5 logyt)
+α
(
0.5(f−m) log
Wm−xm
f−m
+0.5(f−m) log
Wm−ym
f−m
)
(37)
what makes use of the F-players optimal consumption in periods t>m described in equation (27). There-
fore follows
∂V(Wm,m)
∂xm
= 0.5
1+α
x?m
+0.5
(1+α)(f−m)
x?m−Wm
= 0 (38)
x?m =
(1+α)Wm
α(f−m+1)+1
. (39)
Using equation (36) allows us then to conclude that the optimal feasible consumption proposal x?t ∈
Γt of playerM is
x?t =
(1+α)Wt
α(f−t+1)+m−t+1
∀ t6m. (40)
At any time the choice of the optimal consumption proposal x?t does not depend on present or future
choices of F’s consumption proposal yt+i∀ i > 0 but only on present available funds Wt, the own
remaining time to livem−t+1, and parameter α and F’s remaining time to live f−t+1 if α 6= 0.
Acknowledgements We benefited from helpful conversations with Boris Maciejovsky, Werner Güth,
Katinka Pantz and Paul Pezanis-Christou, and the comments of one anonymous referee. Research assis-
tance was provided by Torsten Weiland.
Dynamic Repeated Random Dictatorship and Gender Discrimination 19
References
Ahmed AM (2007) Group identity, social distance and intergroup bias. Journal of Economic Psychology
28(3):324–337
Alatas V, Cameron L, Chaudhuri A, Erkal N, Gangadharan L (2009) Gender, culture, and corrup-
tion: Insights from an experimental analysis. Southern Economic Journal 75(3):663–680, URL
http://ideas.repec.org/a/sej/ancoec/v753y2009p663-680.html
Anderson K, Baland JM (2002) The economics of roscas and intra-household resource allocation. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 117:963–995
Andreoni J, Croson R (2008) Chapter 82 partners versus strangers: Random rematch-
ing in public goods experiments. Handbook of Experimental Economics Re-
sults, vol 1, Elsevier, pp 776 – 783, DOI 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00082-0, URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574072207000820
Andreoni J, Miller J (2002) Giving according to garp: An experimental test of
the consistency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica 70(2):737–753, URL
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0262.00302/full
Andreoni J, Vesterlund L (2001) Which is the fair sex? gender differences in altruism. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 116(1):293–312, URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v116y2001i1p293-
312.html
Ayres I, Siegelman P (1995) Race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car. The American
Economic Review pp 304–321
Bardsley N (2008) Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact? Experimental Economics 11(2):122–133
Becker GS (1971) The economics of discrimination. University of Chicago Press Economics Books
Ben-Ner A, Kong F, Putterman L (2004) Share and share alike? Gender-pairing, personality, and cog-
nitive ability as determinants of giving. Journal of Economic Psychology 25(5):581–589, URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487003000655
Bolton GE, Katok E (1995) An experimental test for gender differences in beneficent behavior. Economics
Letters 48(3-4):287–292, URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v48y1995i3-4p287-292.html
Brosig J (2002) Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner’s dilemma game.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 47(3):275 – 290, DOI 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00211-
6, URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268101002116
Browning M (2000) The saving behaviour of a two-person household. Scandinavian Journal of Economics
102(2):235–251
Browning M, Bourguignon F, Chiappori PA, Lechene V (1994) Income and outcomes: A structural model
of intrahousehold allocation. Journal of Political Economy 102(6):1067–1096
Büsch V, Dahl SÅ, Dittrich DAV (2009) An empirical study of age discrimination in Nor-
way and Germany. Applied Economics 41:633–651, DOI 10.1080/00036840601007344, URL
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036840601007344
Camerer C (2003) Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University
Press, Princeton NJ.
Chen Y, Li SX (2009) Group identity and social preferences. The American Economic Review pp 431–457
Commuri S, Gentry JW (2005) Resource allocation in households with women as chief wage
earners. Journal of Consumer Research: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly 32(2):185–195, URL
http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jconrs/v32y2005i2p185-195.html
Croson R, Gneezy U (2009) Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic Literature 47(2):448–
474
van Dijk F, van Winden F (1997) Dynamics of social ties and local public good provision. Journal of Public
Economics 64(3):323–341
van Dijk F, Sonnemans J, van Winden F (2002) Social ties in a public good experiment.
Journal of Public Economics 85(2):275 – 299, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00090-1, URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272701000901
Dittrich DAV, Güth W, Kocher MG, Pezanis-Christou P (2012) Loss aversion and learning to bid. Eco-
nomica 79:226–257, DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2011.00892.x, URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
0335.2011.00892.x
Eckel CC, Grossman PJ (2001) Chivalry and solidarity in ultimatum games. Economic Inquiry 39(2):171–
188
20 Dennis A. V. Dittrich et al.
Eichberger J, Güth W, Müller W (2003) Attitudes towards risk: An experiment. Metroeconomica 54(1):89–
124, DOI 10.1111/1467-999X.00161, URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-999X.00161
Elster J (1988) Taming chance: Randomization in individual and social decisions. In: McMurrin S (ed)
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol 9, Utah University Press, pp 105–180
Engel C (2011) Dictator games: a meta study. Experimental Economics 14(4):583–610
Engelmann D, Fischbacher U (2009) Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimen-
tal helping game. Games and Economic Behavior 67(2):399 – 407, DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006,
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825609000025
Fershtman C, Gneezy U (2001) Discrimination in a segmented society: An experimental approach. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 116(1):351–377
Fischbacher U (2007) z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Eco-
nomics 10(2):171–178
Gächter S, Falk A (2002) Reputation and reciprocity: Consequences for the labour rela-
tion. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104(1):1–26, DOI 10.1111/1467-9442.00269, URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00269
Houser D, Schunk D (2009) Social environments with competitive pressure: Gender effects in
the decisions of german schoolchildren. Journal of Economic Psychology 30(4):634–641, URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487009000439
Kanagaretnam K, Mestelman S, Nainar K, Shehata M (2009) The impact of so-
cial value orientation and risk attitudes on trust and reciprocity. Journal of
Economic Psychology 30(3):368 – 380, DOI 10.1016/j.joep.2008.12.003, URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487009000142
Lambsdorff JG, Frank B (2011) Corrupt reciprocity – experimental evidence on a men’s game. Interna-
tional Review of Law and Economics 31(2):116–125
Liebrand WBG, McClintock CG (1988) The ring measure of social values: a computerized procedure
for assessing individual differences in information processing and social value orientation. European
Journal of Personality 2:217–230
List JA (2007) On the interpretation of giving in dictator games. Journal of Political Economy 115(3):pp.
482–493, URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/519249
Mason CF, Phillips OR, Redington DB (1991) The role of gender in a non-cooperative
game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 15(2):215–235, URL
http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v15y1991i2p215-235.html
Nowak MA (2006) Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314(5805):1560–1563,
DOI 10.1126/science.1133755, URL http://www.sciencemag.org/content/314/5805/1560.abstract,
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/314/5805/1560.full.pdf
Phipps SA, Burton PS (1998) What’s mine is yours? The influence of male and female
incomes on patterns of household expenditure. Economica 65(260):599–613, URL
http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/econom/v65y1998i260p599-613.html
Pollak RA (2005) Bargaining power in marriage: Earnings, wage rates and household produc-
tion. NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, URL
http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/11239.html
Rabin M (2000) Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration theorem. Econometrica
68(5):1281–1292
Razzaque S (2009) The ultimatum game and gender effect: Experimental evidence from pakistan. The
Pakistan Development Review 48(1):23–46, URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/pid/journl/v48y2009i1p23-
46.html
Saad G, Gill T (2001) Sex differences in the ultimatum game: An evolutionary psychology perspec-
tive. Journal of Bioeconomics 3(2):171–193, URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jbioec/v3y2001i2p171-
193.html
Sell J, Griffith WI, Wilson RK (1993) Are women more cooperative than men in social dilemmas? Social
Psychology Quarterly 56(3):211–222, URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2786779
Simpson B (2003) Sex, fear, and greed: A social dilemma analysis of gender and cooperation. Social
Forces 82:35–52
van Winden F (2012) Affective social ties–missing link in governance theory. Rationality, Markets and
Morals 3(57):108–122
van Winden F, Stallen M, Ridderinkhof KR (2008) On the nature, modeling, and neural bases of social ties.
In: Houser D, McCabe K (eds) Neuroeconomics, Advances in Health Economics and Health Services
Research, vol 20, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp 125–159
Dynamic Repeated Random Dictatorship and Gender Discrimination 21
Winking J, Mizer N (2013) Natural-field dictator game shows no altruistic giving. Evolution and Hu-
man Behavior 34(4):288 – 293, DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.04.002, URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513813000433
Zizzo D (2010) Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments. Experimental Economics
13(1):75–98
Zizzo D (2013) Do dictator games measure altruism? In: Bruni L, Zamagni S (eds) Handbook on the
Economics of Philanthropy, Reciprocity and Social Enterprise, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton, USA, pp 108–112
